Chris Perry, Author

Tag: Japanese feudal wars

  • Takeda-mned if you don’t…

    Takeda-mned if you don’t…

    (I had to make this a two-parter or the joke in the title wouldn’t have worked.)

    Note: Takeda Shingen’s real name was Harunobu, with Shingen being a name he took as part of his religious vocation. In keeping with my policy of using the names that figures are best known by, we’ll be referring to him as Shingen throughout this post, but in other sources, he is often called Harunobu, just so you know.

    Takeda Shingen, who has kind of become an unofficial mascot of this site.

    In June 1541, Takeda Shingen (then known as Harunobu) overthrew his father, Nobutora, and established himself as the leader of the Takeda Clan and master of Kai Province. As we mentioned last time, the exact reasons for this coup aren’t known; some sources say he was overthrowing his tyrannical father, others that it was a self-serving power grab, but whatever his motivation, Harunobu was in charge, and he had big plans.

    The strategic and diplomatic situation that Shingen inherited was full of risks and opportunities. His father had successfully subjugated all of Kai Province and even expanded the borders of Takeda control into neighbouring Shinano. He had been a fierce rival of the Hojo Clan, based in Izu and Sagami Provinces (modern day Kanagawa Prefecture), but had established peaceful relations or alliances with other powerful neighbours.

    Almost immediately, Shingen would chart a radically different course. His father had been allied with the Suwa Clan of Shinano, to the Takeda’s north, but in June 1542, Shingen invaded Shinano Province, defeating the Suwa at the Battle of Kuwabara Castle, and forcing their leader to commit suicide, absorbing their lands into his own.

    Takeda territory is in blue, and the clans that Shingen quickly made enemies of are shown approximately in red.

    Though the result of this campaign is relatively undisputed, the exact nature of how things got started is more controversial. Allegedly, in March 1542, before Shingen’s invasion of Shinano, the Suwa Clan and their allies attacked first, before being defeated at the Battle of Sezawa. The problems come from there being little evidence that this battle ever took place, with some historians suggesting that it might have been a later invention to justify Shingen’s invasion after the fact.

    Regardless of its origins, the campaign would be a long and ultimately successful one for Shingen. A series of battles through the late 1540s put the Takeda in a pre-eminent position in Shinano. By 1553, the clan occupied almost the entire province; only the far north, around the modern city of Nagano, remained outside their control.

    This would prove significant later, but during this period, Shingen would also prove himself to be a savvy political player as well. In 1544, Shingen made peace with the Hojo and then mediated between them and the Imagawa, bringing an end to their conflict, allowing both clans to focus on issues elsewhere, and securing peace on Kai’s southern borders.

    Hojo Ujiyasu, with whom Shingen made peace.

    Turning his attention back to Shinano, Shingen would launch semi-annual campaigns into Shinano, winning a series of victories against the clans based in the province, and slowly extending Takeda dominance. He didn’t have it all his own way, however; in March 1548, the Takeda marched against the Murakami Clan, one of their chief rivals for control of Shinano. The Battle of Uedahara was arguably a draw, as both sides suffered similar losses; however, the Takeda advance was stopped, and they lost several key commanders, with Shingen himself being wounded.

    In July of that year, another of Shingen’s enemies in Shinano, the Ogasawara Clan, sought to take advantage and push the Takeda back into Kai; however, at the Battle of Shiojiri Pass, the Ogasawara were decisively defeated by a resurgent Shingen, and the momentum would swing back in favour of the Takeda.

    In 1550, Shingen took control of what is today called the Matsumoto Basin (around the modern city of the same name), but a second serious defeat would follow in September of that year, as the Takeda tried and failed to take Toishi Castle. Sources differ, with some saying the Takeda lost a fifth of their forces, and others saying it was as many as two-thirds.

    Although losses were clearly heavy, as with Uedahara a few years earlier, Shingen wasn’t on the back foot for long. In April 1551, Toishi Castle was taken (supposedly through trickery), and over the next two years, he would drive the Murakami Clan out of Shinano, until they were forced to flee Shinano entirely.

    This left Shingen in control of almost all of Shinano, but it also presented a new problem. In fleeing Shinano, the Murakami Clan sought the support of another powerful player in the region, the lord of Echigo Province and lord of a clan that was every bit as powerful as the Takeda, Uesugi Kenshin. Though neither side knew it yet, the stage was now set for one of the great rivalries of the Sengoku Period.

    A later depiction of Uesugi Kenshin, Shingen’s legendary rival.

    Shingen and Kenshin would clash repeatedly in the years to come, mostly at and around the now-famous battlefield of Kawanakajima (which literally means “The Island in the River”). The first clash of these rivals would come in April 1553, and would be indecisive, but the frontier in northern Shinano would remain volatile.

    In 1554, Shingen strengthened his diplomatic position by marrying his son to a daughter of the Imagawa Clan, followed shortly afterwards by a marriage of his son to a daughter of the Hojo Clan, who were also conveniently an enemy of the Uesugi. Following the establishment of the so-called Koso Alliance, Shingen secured control of southern Shinano and advanced into neighbouring Mino Province, securing the submission of several border clans in the process.

    The second and third Battles of Kawanakajima would be fought in 1555 and 1557, respectively, and both would end in further stalemate, but following the third battle, the Shogun (very much a figurehead at this point) issued a command that both sides make peace. Kenshin accepted immediately, but Shingen responded that he would only make peace if the Shogun named him shugo (governor) of Shinano, which was duly granted.

    In 1559, the Eiroku Famine and a serious flood in Kai Province led to the cessation of hostilities (at least temporarily) and that year, Shingen became a monk, formally adopting the name Shingen. Exactly why he chose to become a monk isn’t recorded, but it is speculated that it was in response to the twin disasters of famine and flood, with Shingen perhaps seeking divine intervention.

    Whether or not the gods were listening isn’t known, but after 1560, Shingen and the Takeda clan would begin to move away from older alliances and local authority and towards a policy of seeking power on the national stage. In May 1560, the Imagawa, allies of the Takeda, were severely defeated by the rising star that was Oda Nobunaga, and although Shingen publicly declared his intention to continue the alliance, he made secret arrangements with Nobunaga, with his son, Katsuyori, marrying Nobunaga’s adopted daughter.

    Oda Nobunaga. He would go on to be one of the most significant figures in Japanese history, but in the 1560s he was just getting started.

    The relationship continued to break down until 1567, when the Imagawa ended the trade of salt (abundant in their coastal provinces) to Kai, effectively cutting the Takeda off from this vital resource. The next year, in cooperation with a former Imagawa vassal, Tokugawa Ieyasu (then known as Matsudaira Motoyasu), Shingen invaded Imagawa territory, taking Suruga Province, whilst Ieyasu invaded Totomi, to the west.

    The invasion was a military success, but had serious diplomatic repercussions more or less immediately. The relationship with the Imagawa was obviously already pretty bad, but when Shingen tried to enlist the help of the Hojo in attacking Suruga, he was rebuffed, and the Hojo would instead send troops to support their Imagawa allies.

    The relationship with Ieyasu, always a marriage of convenience, broke down swiftly as well. The erstwhile allies got into a dispute about actual control of Totomi Province, and Ieyasu took his proverbial ball and went home, making peace with the Imagawa, and ignoring his previous agreement with Shingen.

    Tokugawa Ieyasu. Much like Nobunaga, he came up in the shadow of men like Shingen, but the future was very bright indeed for him and his clan.

    Shingen, now surrounded by potential enemies, sought out allies amongst the pre-existing enemies of the Hojo, and launched a counter-attack in 1569, getting as far as the Hojo capital at Odawara, which he briefly laid siege to before withdrawing, contenting himself with burning the town around the fortress.

    Retreating to Kai, Shingen defeated a pursuing Hojo force at the Battle of Mimasu Pass, effectively ending the Hojo threat to Kai and preventing them from intervening further in the invasion of Suruga. By the end of 1569, Shingen was in complete control of the province.

    Shingen would consolidate his position, but in 1571, Oda Nobunaga, with whom Shingen had enjoyed good relations previously, attacked and burned Mt Hiei, one of the holiest sites in Japanese Buddhism, sparking religious outrage across the realm.

    Shingen, who was a monk, remember, was personally outraged, and allowed surviving monks from Mt Hiei to take refuge in Kai. In 1572, the Shogun, Ashikaga Yoshiaki, sent a letter, reaching out to Shingen and calling on him to march on Kyoto and destroy Nobunaga.

    By this point, the Shogun’s options were severely limited (Yoshiaki would prove to be the last Ashikaga Shogun), but it was probably a smart move. By the early 1570s, Nobunaga had risen to become one of the most powerful warlords in Japan, and there simply weren’t that many contemporaries who could match him for strength and strategic acumen.

    Ashikaga Yoshiaki, the last Ashikaga Shogun. Even by the standards of his troubled dynasty, Yoshiaki was a powerless leader.

    Shingen had the strength, he had the experience, and after Mt Hiei, he had plenty of reason to answer the Shogun’s request. Gathering somewhere in the region of 27,000 men, a gigantic army for the time, the Takeda Steamroller began its move west in October 1572, first striking at Tokugawa Ieyasu’s territory in Mikawa Province, taking several fortresses in a matter of days, and forcing Ieyasu to call for help from Nobunaga.

    Nobunaga, however, was busy elsewhere, and could only spare 3000 troops to help, not nearly enough, and whenever Tokugawa forces made a stand, they were defeated. Initially, Ieyasu sought to defend the castle at Hamamatsu, a strong position, but weak strategically, as Shingen was able to bypass it on his march to Kyoto.

    Forced to either give battle or see himself rendered effectively impotent, Ieyasu marched out and met Shingen at Mikatagahara in January 1573. The result was a catastrophic defeat for Ieyasu, who saw his army scattered in all directions, with thousands left for dead on the battlefield. It was only due to the heroic resistance of several of his retainers that Ieyasu himself was able to survive the battle.

    A 19th century depiction of the Battle of Mikatagahara.

    Flush with victory, the Takeda forces would continue their advance, defeating what remained of the Tokugawa Clan and securing many castles throughout Mikawa Province. At that point, it may well have seemed that Shingen was well placed to launch a final thrust at the capital, and it isn’t unreasonable to speculate that, had such an attack occurred, he may have been successful, and we might today be talking about a ‘Takeda Shogunate’.

    Alas, it wasn’t to be. Despite his military and political acumen, Shingen was still just a man. His health had been getting steadily worse for years. As early as 1571, he was forced to abandon military action due to symptoms as severe as coughing up blood, and after Mikatagahara, his condition took a turn for the worse.

    In early spring 1573, Shingen made the decision (or had it made for him) to return to Kai Province to recover his health. Somewhere along the road home, however, he died. Exactly when and where he passed isn’t clear, but most historians agree it was sometime in April. According to Shingen’s will, his death was kept a secret, and although this would later lead to speculation around the circumstances of his death (perhaps best seen in the film Kagemusha), Shingen’s remains were most likely returned to his capital in modern Kofu, Yamanashi Prefecture.

    A later artistic rendition of Shingen’s final moments.

    Shingen’s sudden death raises some of the most interesting ‘what if?’ questions of this period. He was arguably one of the few men who could match Oda Nobunaga for strength and cunning, and it is possible that, if he had lived, he might have defeated Nobunaga and perhaps led the unification of Japan himself.

    This is ultimately not how things played out, but Shingen’s role in Japanese history didn’t end with his death. Although he had a well-earned reputation as a warrior, he was also a wise administrator and reformer, and many of the policies he introduced in his territories were adopted by those who came after him, with some even going on to influence Japanese law after the Sengoku Jidai, but we’ll talk about that another time.

    Sources
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%AD%A6%E7%94%B0%E4%BF%A1%E7%8E%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%89%E6%96%B9%E3%83%B6%E5%8E%9F%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%9D%BE%E6%9C%AC%E7%9B%86%E5%9C%B0
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%A0%A5%E7%9F%B3%E5%B4%A9%E3%82%8C
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A1%A9%E5%B0%BB%E5%B3%A0%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%8A%E7%94%B0%E5%8E%9F%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%94%B2%E7%9B%B8%E9%A7%BF%E4%B8%89%E5%9B%BD%E5%90%8C%E7%9B%9F
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%AE%AE%E5%B7%9D%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%B2%B3%E6%9D%B1%E3%81%AE%E4%B9%B1
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%AB%98%E9%81%A0%E5%90%88%E6%88%A6
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%94%B2%E5%B7%9E%E6%B3%95%E5%BA%A6%E6%AC%A1%E7%AC%AC
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%A1%91%E5%8E%9F%E5%9F%8E%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%80%AC%E6%B2%A2%E3%81%AE%E6%88%A6%E3%81%84
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashikaga_Yoshiaki
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mikatagahara


  • Kamakura III – The Jokyu War

    We’ve already talked about Imperial decline during the Heian Period. Over many centuries, central control eroded, until eventually the provinces proved to be ungovernable. Eventually, the power of the Imperial Court was usurped by Minamoto no Yoritomo, who established the Kamakura Shogunate in Kamakura, obviously.

    You may not be surprised to hear that the Emperor wasn’t best pleased with this turn of events. Although the actual power of the Emperor had been largely theoretical for decades, there had always been a veneer of ‘Imperial’ authority. The rise of the first Shogunate, however, did away with that.

    With supreme military power firmly in Yoritomo’s hands, there was little the Emperor could do to change the status quo. However, as we’ve discussed, Yoritomo’s heirs proved not to be the model of their father. By the dawn of the 13th Century, the Kamakura ‘Shogunate’ was in fact ruled by regents, or Shikken, from the Hojo Clan.

    In 1219, the regent was Hojo Yoshitoki, who shared power with his influential sister Hojo Masako, the so-called ‘Nun Shogun’. That year, Masako’s son, Sanemoto, the third Shogun, was assassinated, bringing an end to the line of Minamoto Shoguns (Yoritomo and his two sons). Although the Hojo were already in effective control, the end of the ‘legitimate’ line of Shoguns presented an apparent opportunity for their enemies to challenge them.

    Emperor Go-Toba

    In a period where Emperors were often well-decorated figureheads, Go-Toba stood out. He was highly educated, as most courtiers were, but he had also shown skill at martial arts, earning him respect and loyalty from warrior families in the west and north. Unfortunately for him, the Throne still drew its income from its land holdings, and when the Shogunate appointed officials to oversee those holdings, the money taken in taxes often didn’t find its way to the Emperor.

    Emperor Go-Toba, whose attempts to restore Imperial power would start the Jokyu War.

    After Sanemoto’s assassination in 1219, the Hojo approached Go-Toba about the possibility of one of the Emperor’s sons becoming the next Shogun. Go-Toba attempted to negotiate, seeking the removal of Shogunate officials from Imperial holdings.

    The Shogunate sent a force of 1000 men under Yoshitoki’s brother in an attempt to intimidate the Emperor. Go-Toba wasn’t easily scared, however, and negotiations broke down, although the Emperor would offer a concession; he would allow a member of the Imperial family to become Shogun, as long as it wasn’t a prince of the main royal line.

    The Hojo were satisfied with this, and Kujo Yoritsune, who was only a little over a year old, was chosen as the fourth Shogun. However, because Yoritsune was a baby, the position of the Hojo as regents was secure, and, for a time at least, peace endured.

    The elevation of a member of the Imperial house to the position of Shogun did nothing about the underlying issues, however, and in July 1219, just a few months after the previous negotiations, the military governor of the area around Kyoto, (who had been appointed by the Shogun) was attacked and killed by warriors acting on the Emperor’s orders.

    Some records say that the governor had been planning to launch a coup and make himself Shogun, with Go-Toba, made aware of the plot, acting to stop the plot before it came to fruition. Other sources, however, point out how unlikely it is for Go-Toba to have had a Shogunate official killed as a favour to the Shogun, and it is more likely that the governor either discovered, or was made aware of, the Emperor’s plans, and was removed accordingly.

    The unfortunate fellow apparently took his own life when his residence (which was within the grounds of the Imperial Palace) was surrounded and burned by Imperial loyalists, and whatever the reasons, this was a direct attack by forces representing the Emperor on those representing the Shogun. The Emperor then asked the Shogunate, Court Officials, and local temples and shrines to donate money to help rebuild the burned residence, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, most of them refused to pay up.

    During rebuilding work, rumours spread that Go-Toba was quietly gathering allies and raising an army. It was also alleged that he had asked shrines and temples around the capital to invoke the power of the gods on the Emperor’s behalf, which was quite the provocation, apparently.

    War Begins

    Then, in Spring 1221, Go-Toba gathered troops in the capital under the pretext of protecting religious sites and ceremonies. On May 15th, he dropped the pretext; however, when forces loyal to the Imperial Side attacked the offices of the Shogun in Kyoto, burning them and killing the officials, which, as declarations of war go, is pretty definitive.

    On the same day, Go-Toba issued a formal Imperial decree, ordering all the warriors of the nation to arrest Yoshitoki, who was declared an outlaw and enemy of the court. Within a few days, warriors from across western Japan had risen against the Shogun, and Go-Toba believed, rather flippantly, that the issuance of an Imperial decree would fatally undermine the Shogunate.

    This is one of those times that later writers absolutely love to dramatise. It’s all honour, loyalty, duty unto death, etc. but the reality is that, despite an Imperial Decree, and a counter-decree from Hojo Masako, the majority of the warriors across the nation (those who were directly tied to either side through blood or obligation) sided with whoever they thought would benefit them the most if they won.

    In those calculations, the Shogunate had the advantage; the Shogun had the right to distribute land, and most of the warrior families expected to be rewarded with the lands and titles of those who had sided with the Emperor and the court, who was generally believed to have been likely to favour himself and his courtiers, in the event of their victory.

    So, for all their vaunted ‘honour’, the Samurai would (and not for the last time) side with those they thought would give them the best deal, and by the time they marched, the armies loyal to the Shogun are said to have numbered nearly 200,000.

    A later illustration of a Samurai as they might have appeared during the Jokyu War.

    The Shogunate army was actually three separate forces, with 40,000 men heading by a northern route, another force of 50,000 heading through the mountains, and the third, largest force of 100,000, following the main Tokaido Road, with all three marching on Kyoto.

    The Imperial side seems to have been caught off guard by first the size, then the speed of the Shogunate forces. It appears that the Emperor had believed his decree would be enough to secure mass defections, and when the opposite occurred, the forces loyal to the throne were out of position and hugely outnumbered.

    Resistance was scattered and ineffective, with some sources suggesting that the main army took just 22 days to complete the march from Kamakura to Kyoto, which might be an exaggeration, but goes some way to highlighting how badly prepared the Imperial Army was.

    Though the court was able to gather warriors from Western Japan, the numbers were nowhere near what they had expected, and besides, the rapid advance of the Shogunate army meant that reinforcements wouldn’t have been able to reach the capital in time.

    In desperation, Go-Toba went to Mt Hiei, on the outskirts of Kyoto, and pleaded with the famed warrior monks for support. The monks, partly out of opposition to the Emperor, and partly due to their fear of the strength of the Shogun, refused to help, and Go-Toba was left with an army of around 18,000 to defend the capital.

    Outnumbered 5 to 1, Imperial forces took position near Uji, and on June 13th, another Battle of Uji (the third in 50 years) took place. Despite brave resistance, the Imperial side was overwhelmed, and on June 15th, Shogunate forces were in Kyoto. What followed was an orgy of violence, as the houses of Imperial officials and supporters were ransacked and burned, and the citizens suffered at the hands of the rampaging army.

    As Kyoto burned, Go-Toba sent a message to the Shogunate army, withdrawing the Imperial order to arrest Yoshitoki, and blaming the whole thing on his ministers and advisors. Abandoned by the Emperor, some of his supporters fought on in vain, but the final defeat was inevitable, and by July, serious fighting was over, with a few fugitives evading capture until October.

    In the aftermath, Go-Toba was exiled, and eventually replaced as Emperor by Go-Horikawa, and the estates of those who had been killed fighting for the Court, or proscribed afterwards, were distributed to the Shogun’s supporters. Direct control was established over Kyoto, and any semblance of independent military strength was ended; every warrior was now the direct vassal of the Emperor, or else.

    The Shogunate also took control of the purse strings for the court. Prior to the war, the Emperor had held land in his own right and drawn income from it, but now, those lands were ruled directly by the Shogun, and the government in Kamakura could now decide how much, if any, cash the Emperor would get.

    The end of the Jokyu War would mark the zenith of Shogunate, and therefore Hojo power, and for a time, they would rule more or less unchallenged, but some 60 years later, a new threat would emerge.

    Since the dawn of the 13th Century, a previously fractured and quarrelsome people had been united under a single ruler and gone on to conquer an empire the likes of which had never been seen. Though this great conqueror was long dead, his sons and grandsons had continued his work, and in 1260, a new ruler was enthroned, one who would go on to make himself master of China and Korea before seeking new conquests across the sea.

    In 1274, Kublai Khan, grandson of the Great Genghis, had ambitions to make himself master of the world, and he cast his eyes on Japan.

    The Mongols were coming.

    Sources
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%89%BF%E4%B9%85%E3%81%AE%E4%B9%B1
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamakura_shogunate
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azuma_Kagami
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C5%8Dky%C5%AB_War
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emperor_Go-Toba
    https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%BE%8C%E9%B3%A5%E7%BE%BD%E5%A4%A9%E7%9A%87